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1Preface
To determine the capability of a fault tolerant computing system to
diagnose failure situations such that transparent reconfiguration can take
place in the sense that the identified failed elements of the system are
removed and the remaining operable resources are redeployed is a necessary,
fundamental component of the validation process [ 1 ]. To make this contribution
to the validation process requires the following:
(i) An abstract model of the system which can describe the essence
of the testing strategies employed by fault tolerant computing
systems such as SIFT or FTMP.
(2) An abstract fault model which can describe the broad range of
failure situations to which a system can be subjected.
(3) A theory which utilizes the system model and fault model so
as to characterize the conditions which must be satisfied
by a fault tolerant computing system such that various levels
of diagnosis quality are achieved.
(4) A methodology which is demonstrated to be feasible and which
describes fault to error transformations such that the above
models and theory can be applied to the diagnosability
analysis of fault tolerant computing systems.
In this Executive Summary, we consider each of these four points to show
that the program being supported by NASA at Johns Hopkins represents a total,
comprehensive approach to the intermittent/transient fault issue. We feel our
work is a complementary theoretical and experimental effort which will eventually
result in a fundamental validation tool for use in a clinical environment such as
NASA's AirLab.
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i. A Contribution to the Validation Process
Fault tolerant computer systems are currently being designed to realize
specific reliability requirements. The proof that any specific design actually
satisfies these reliability requirements is referred to as validation. Currently,
a number of approaches are being explored which have as a goal the development
of tools to contribute to the validation process [i]. The following is an over-
view of the approach being taken at the Electrical Engineering Department of
The Johns Hopkins University. Our overall goal in this effort is to develop an
interrelated theory and experimental methodology which can be used in a laboratory
situation to measure the capability of a fault tolerant computing system (such as
SIFT or FTMP) to diagnose intermittent/transient faults (I/T faults). Such diag-
nostic capability is fundamental to the transparent reconfiguration process of
fault tolerant computing systems by which faulty subsystems (called units) are •
identified and the remaining operable resources are redeployed. The experimental
and theoretical work we are doing addresses the problem of developing an abstract
model (with fidelity to SIFT and FTMP structures) for which necessary and sufficient
conditions can be established which must be satisfied to achieve various diagnosing
capabilities. The application of this abstract model to a specific system requires
the availability of data which must, therefore, be generated in a controlled labora-
tory situation for the specific system under consideration. Hence, a verified, well-
defined methodology for generating this data is being established. To the extent
thatsuch diagnosing capability is important to reliability in fault tolerant
computing systems, this theory and supporting methodology wil! serve as•a foundation
for validation efforts.
2. A Systems Level/Error Level Approach
It must first be understood that all current designs of fault tolerant
computing systems are large configurations of computationally and logically
interconnected subsystems, called units. These units can be hardware, firmware,
or software subsystems (or combinations); and it is their complex interactions
and responses to data which constitute system operation. When describing the
operation of a fault tolerant•computer, it is, therefore, this system level view
of interacting units that must be modeled; for if, say, a logic circuit level or
instruction word level view were modeled, then when an attempt was made to develop
an overall systems'm_del, the details of each composing subsystem model would
compound to produce such overwhelming complexity that the development of a
comprehensive systems model would be impossible.
Similarly, regarding the capability of a fault tolerant computer to diagnose
classes of faults, while it is important to study particular types of circuits or
instruction executions so as to characterize their faulty operation or effects in
the presence of I/T faults, these low level approaches are too dependent upon the
particular circuit or instruction word involved to contribute of themselves to the
goal of systems level assessments for the validations of fault tolerant computing
systems. In other words, such low level results are an end in themselves; they
are a useful input to validation only if a developed process or technique which
has been generally established can utilize them. Accordingly, since it is our
goal to develop a theory and experimental methodology which will use such results
in contributing to validation, we must look at the faulty operation of units at a
level which is in agreement with our systems level view of the overall design.
That is, we must consider faults at the error level. As this complements our
systems level model of fault tolerant computers, it gives usa framework for the
development of our theory and the establishment of our supporting experimental
methodology which is not tied to the specifics or peculiarities of any circuits
or instruction sets.
43. A New Viewpoint of I/T Faults
All of our results (past and current) have been achieved because we have
taken a fundamentally new view of I/T faults. Heretofore, researchers have
viewed I/T faults as special cases of permanent faults. That is, an I/T fault
in a computer system had previously always been viewed as being equivalent to a
permanent fault except that it somehow turned on and off. In effect, the I/T
fault case was always treated as a more difficult to handle, elusive version of
a permanent fault. Because of this, all theory, analysis tools, and fault
tolerant computer designs that were developed for permanent fault situations were
useless relative to I/T fault cases since they depended on the constant, repeat-
able exhibition of an error mode. When forced to consider I/T faults with these
permanent fault based theory,tools,or designs,there was no recourse but to
"simply hope to be lucky enough to catch the I/T faults acting like permanent
faults".
We have "turned the table", so to speak, on this viewpoint. We, instead,
view permanent faults as special cases of I/T faults. That is, we consider a
permanent fault to be an I/T fault with a very long duration. The ramifications
of this simple reversal in viewpoint are major because anything (that is, theory,
analysis tools, fault tolerant computing designs,...) that has been accomplished
or developed for the pe_nanent fault case must now be a special case of what is
necessary for the I/T fault case. This has permitted us to study permanent fault
work as an indicator of what a degenerate version of the results we were seeking
for I/T faults looked like. This was immensely usefu! because it meant we were
not starting from absolute zero. Indeed, we had a good picture of a version of the
answers we sought. Moreover, a potentially even more important ramification is
now being investigated. It seems that it might be feasible to predict or
measure the I/T fault diagnosis capabilities of a system based on the permanent
fault diagnosis capabilities. This would mean that systems that have been
studied or experimented with from a permanent fault point of view might not have
to go through the process again for I/T faults; instead, the theory we are
deve!oping might be capable of extrapolating the existing permanent fault results
to the I/T fault case.
4. A Formal Model for Diagnosability Analysis
Given our new viewpoint of I/T faults and that a systems level perspective
is to be taken, a formal model with which to analyze the capability of a fault
tolerant computing System to diagnose fault situations must be specified. We
]:avechosen to use as the basis for our work a systems level model which is well-
known and has received considerable attention in the fault tolerant computing
" research area over the past ten years. Moreover, the model is totally appro-
priate for distributed fault tolerant computing systems such as SIFT and FTMP.
However, the previous research efforts (that is, the reported work that pre-
ceded our involvement in our NASA Grant) considered only the special case of
permanent faults. One of our major contributions up to this point on this NASA
grant ]:asbeen our extension to the general case of I/T faults of many of the
significant research results based on this mode! that have been achieved by
previous researchers for the special case of only permanent faults. Some of our
extensions have already been reported in the literature [2]; indeed, our previous
extensions are now recognized as benchmark contributions to the theory of systems
]evel diagnosability analysis. Moreover, our current results are even more
significant as we have now broadened the scope of the theory to include combina-
tions of permanent and I/T failures in the systems. We refer to these as hybrid
fault cases. This new hybrid fault class allows us to analyze fault tolerant
systems where some of the units composing the system are known to not be sus-
ceptible to faults which cause I/T error modes, and it also allows us to con-
sider the response of fault tolerant systems to unanticipated fault environments
where combinations of the units assume permanent and I/T error modes.
In order to give an overview of some of our new results and our motivation
for our current and future efforts, it will be necessary to briefly describe a
(rather restrictive) version of our model. Given a fault tolerant computing
system that is to be analyzed for its capability of diagnosing I/T faults (and,
]?ecauseof our view of I/T faults it will also be analyzed for the special case
For example, two recent survey articles on systems level diagnosis and I/T faults
have entire sections devoted to the results we reported in [2]. These two articles
are: "Systems Level Fault Diagnosis" by A. Friedman and L. Simoncini, to appear in
IEEE Computer Magazine, and "Intermittent Fault Analysis in Digital Systems" by
S. Su, Proceedings of the 1979 National Computer Conference.
6of all permanent faults), the system is partitioned into logically and compu-
tionally disjoint units (often referred to as least reducible units). This set
of LRU's, or units, can be described, in general, by the set U = (Ul,U2....,u )n
Each unit, say, u. E U is capable of testing other units in the system; however1
a unit is assumed to not test itself. To perform fault diagnosis, each unit
u. c U is assigned a particular subset of the remaining units in the system toI
test. This assignment of testing tasks to units is referred to as the connec-
tion assignment of the system. The connection assignment is described by a set
T of tests, where a test t.. s T if and only if unit u. tests unit u.
l] l 3
The connection assignment can also be represented by a directed graph model,
where there is a node representing each unit u. s U , and where there is a
1
directed edge from a node u. to a node u. if and only if t.. s T . A test
i 3 13
t.. is said to have been applied when unit u. performs a test on unit u. ,
l] ± 3
and we refer to a test set application as the application of each test t.. s T
13
Figure 1 is an example of our graph mode!. It consists of 7 units and each
unit tests 3 other units.
In our model, the application of a test t.. E T implies an evaluation13
of unit u. by unit u. to determine whether u. is faulty or fault-free.
3 ± 3
The details of the component failures which can inflict the units are only of
concern to us at the error level to the extent that each such failure can result
in the inflicted unit behaving as either a permanently faulty unit or as an I/T
faulty unit. A permanently faulty unit can generically be considered to be a
unit which is in some fixed error mode of operation such that its functional
behavior is different from the unit's error-free mode of operation. An I/T
faulty unit can generically be considered to be a unit which can be at any given
time in any of several possible error modes, or, indeed, even the error-free
mode. A test, t.. , can be viewed as a sequence of stimuli which is to be13
applied to u. by u. so as to elicit responses from u. that are evaluated3 x 3
by u. and which are sufficient for the detection of the existence of all the
1
possible error modes of operation of importance in u.3
If we assume for the moment that u. is fault-free, it should be empha-1
sized that in the permanently faulty case, since u. is in a fixed error mode,3
the appropriate stimulus within the test t.. will always be eventually appliedl]
so that the presence of the error mode will be detected. However, in the I/T
faulty case, since the error modes which u. exhibits can change or, indeed,
U
since u. can even be, at times, in the error-free mode, it is possible that as3
the stimuli within t.. are applied, u. might change its modes so that, at any
•3 3
time, the particular stimulus applied is not capable of detecting the error mode
7uI
u
7 u2
u u3
u5 u4
Figure i: A PMC model of a system of 7 units which employs
the 131,3 design.
8being exhibited by u. at that time. If, in fact, this were the case, then the3
fault-free u. would evaluate the I/T faulty u. to be fault-free on the basisl 3
of this application of t.. . This is the essence of the additional difficultyl]
introduced by the existence of I/T faults beyond that caused by permanent faults.
As a means of expressing the results of a test, t.. , in our model, we can13
associate an outcome a.. to t.. . A complete set of test outcomes, that is
13 13
an outcome a.. for each t.. E T , is called a syndrome. The different collec-
l] 13
tions of outcomes that can be formed in the syndromes are indications of the data
that can be used by the fault tolerant computing system to diagnose faults.
It should also be clear that the details of the connection assignment
reflect directly on the amount of information that can be obtained from a test
set application for the identification of faulty units. Accordingly, if a
diagnosing capability of a system is desired for which a class of fault situations
is specified and the manner in which sets of faulty units which fallinto this
class are to be identified on the basis of syndromes that can result from a test
application is described, then conditions (necessary and sufficient) can be
determined for the connection assignment which must be satisfied to guarantee
the desired diagnosing capability. Given a system design, we can then analyze
the connection assignment of the system to see whether a desired diagnosing
capability is achieved or to measure what diagnosing capability is achieved.
To illustrate by using this version of our model the excessive diffi-
culties created by I/T faults in fault tolerant computing systems, suppose
that we are using the simplest outcome set in our model where for a test t.. ,l]
a value of i(0) is assigned to a.. if u. evaluates u. as faulty (fault-13 l 3
free). We can now more specifically describe the scope of the test result
possibilities when we have permanently and intermittently faulty units in our
models. This is done by means of the Outcome Matrix shown in Figure 2. In
general, tests can be performed by units which are fault-free, permanently
faulty, or intermittently faulty. The Outcome Matrix then specifies the outcome
of a test t.. for all possible combinations of faulty and fault-free conditions
13
for u. and u. . A justification for each of the entries in the Outcome Matrix
1 ] -
can be given briefly as follows. If u.± is permanently faulty, then when tij
is applied, it cannot be apriori specified whether u will evaluate u.l 3
correctly regardless of whether u. is permanently faulty, fault-free, or I/T3
faulty. In each of these cases it then follows that a.. = 0 or 1 . It is13
U.
3
u. Permanently I/T1 Fault-Free
faulty faulty
Permanently 0 or 1 0 or 1 0 or 1
faulty
Fault-Free 1 0 0 or 1
I/T faulty 0 or 1 0 or 1 0 or 1
a..
13
Outcome Matrix
Figure 2
i0
important to stress that when u. is permanently faulty and u. is either perma-1 3
nently faulty or fault-free, then although a.. = 0 or 1 and cannot be aprio_il]
specified before the initial application, repeated applications of t.. will13
always yield the same outcome as a result of the fixed error mode(s) involved;
however, when u. is I/T faulty, repeated applications of t.. can yield
3 13
different outcomes as a result of the different modes which u. can exhibit.]
Next, if u. is fault-free, then the entries for the cases where u. is perma-
l 3
nently faulty or fault-free are clear; and, again, because the error modes
exhibited by u. can change when it is I/T faulty, we have that in this case3
a.. : 0 or 1 , and the outcome can vary for different applications of t..
•3 m3
Finally, if u. is intermittently faulty, a.. = 0 or 1 for all possibilities
I 13
for u. ; and, for all cases in general, the outcome can vary for different]
applications of tij Now, refer to Figure i. Suppose that units Ul, u2,
and u3 were permanently faulty. To diagnose this all permanent fault situa-
tion, we would have (based on the Outcome Matrix) one of 512 possible syndromes
to work with after a test set application. It can be shown that each of these
syndromes would be sufficient for the diagnosis of this fault situation [2]. But
now suppose instead that uI and u2 were I/T faulty and u3 were permanently
faulty. There would then be 16,384 syndromes that could result after a test set
application, and most (approximately 95%) would be useless for diagnostic purposes.
In other words, this hybrid fault situation causes the production of many more
syndromes than the permanent fault situation, and, moreover, most are of no help
in diagnosis.
Many examples much worse than this could be presented here, but our point
is that with our model we can illustrate such results and can furthermore show
how the testing assignments in the system can be augmented to increase the I/T
diagnosing capability. It should also be stressed that the above is based on a
rather simple version of our model. We are currently developing a much more
general model. This new model will to a still finer degree allow us to characterize
the testing strategies of fault tolerant computing systems so that diagnos_mbility
analysis can take place. This is discussed somewhat in the next section.
ii
5. Generalization of the Model to Broaden Applicability
Our model (in the form described in the previous section and its more
general form) and the theory we have developed and are now developing around it
make possible the diagnosability analysis of fault tolerant computing systems.
However, there are restrictions in its applications. Note that the model thus
described lumps all faults into either a permanent or I/T fault class. No
distinction is made between different types of permanent or I/T faults. While
this lumped fault class approach yields important results, because of its simpli-
fication of the actual fault situation, it does have restrictions in its applica-
tions since in practice there are many different classes of faults acting on a
unit to make it function incorrectly. For example, because some of the faults
may be easier to detect than others, by placing al! of these faults into one
category (I/T faults), potentially useful information regarding diagnosis has
been lost. By expanding the I/T fault category into more specified and varied
fault classes, additional information is made available which we should be able
to use to improve the overall diagnosability analysis of the system. For example,
tradeoffs could be considered regarding the time consumed in the testing procedures
and the information obtained from each test, or (for the above form of the model)
the number of links required by the network to achieve various fault diagnosis
capabilities can be determined.
In considering possible generalizations of our fault model to increase
the applicability of the diagnosability theory, suppose we specified a set of m
fault classes: F:{f0,fl,..,fm_ I} These classes could be assumed to include
both permanent and I/T faults, and f may be considered to be the fault-free0
case. A straightforward expansion of the (3x3) Outcome Matrix would yield an
(m X m) Outcome Matrix where all faults were listed in the rows and columns°
But little would actually be gained by this extension since most of the entries
would stil! be "0 or i" . However, instead of restricting the value of a. to
z)
only 0 or 1 , suppose we let a be a variable between 0 and 1 which
x]
corresponds to the probability that u when inflicted by a specified fault inl
F would assess u when inflicted by a specified fault in F to be faulty.]
Clearly, such additional information in the Outcome Matrix could be exploited in
diagnosability analysis. Unfortunately, I/T fault situations are not simple
enough to permit this straightfo_;ard generalization. In particular, a unit can
react differently to the same fault depending upon the function or task it is
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performing when the fault occurs. This was masked in the lumped version of the
Outcome Matrix of Figure 2 as ent'rieswere made "0 or i" if the outcome was not
fixed. To permit individual fault classes to be considered, the task being per-
formed must be taken into account. For our systems level view, the tasks are
described as programs. All programs which the units will execute can be considered
as the set of programs P={P0' Pl' "'" , Pn_l ] Included in these n programs
are test programs, applications programs, and testing programs. The test programs
can be viewed as programs executed by a unit under test in response to the demand
of the testing unit. Clearly, certain test programs can be expected to be more
effective for different fault classes than for others. The applications programs,
of course, perform the tasks or jobs for which the unit was defined. The testing
programs are programs run by a unit when it takes the action of testing another
unit. An Outcome Matrix which contained such a classification of programs or tasks
and faults would greatly increase the potential applicability of a diagnosis theory
to current fault tolerant computing designs.
In other words, given the units of a system, by so classifying all the
tasks, and hy specifying classes of faults that can inflict the units, a new, more
applicable outcome specification can be described. It can be represented as a
four dimensiona! array, and a planar description of it is shown in Figure 3. We
will refer to this new outcome specification as the extended Outcome Matrix.
Each unit now has a fault axis and a program axis, resulting in a ui-plane and a
u -plane; and the entries in the table are no longer binary values, but probability]
values from 0 to i.
We are currently developing a general theory of diagnosability to exploit
the information contained in the Extended Outcome Matrix. Our goal is to develop
an enhanced diagnosability theory that is applicable to fault tolerant computing
systems as complex as SIFT and FTMP. In genera!, a fault tolerant computing sys-
tem continuously makes decisions about its own integrity. Such a decision-making
process can be extremely complex, but the result of the decision-making process
is relatively simple: a unit is either further utilized in computation or it is
removed from the system. However, since removal of a unit effectively reduces
the future reconfiguration capability and the potential performance, it must be
done with considerable caution. In particular, for I/T faults, major complica-
tions exist heyond that which exist for permanent faults. A brief discussion of
the nature of these complications would be appropriate here.
±J
U03
U.
1
f0'P0 f0'Pl f0'P2 --- fl,P0 fl'Pl fl'P2 --- fm_l,Pn_l
m-l,n-i
0,0 0,i 0,2 1,0 i,i 1,2 a0fo'P0 a ao 0 a o "'" ao a0 o ao o "'" ,0
f0,Pl
1
0,0 m-l,n-I
fm-l'Pn-i am-l,n-1 - _ _ am-l,n-i
k,l
a. . is the probabilitythat unit u. executingtesting program p_ while inflicted
it 3 1 3
by fault f. assesses that u. is faultyon the basis of its executionof programi 3
Pl while inflictedby fault fk "
ExtendedOutcomeMatrix
Figure 3
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TO begin, both intermittent and transient faults are usually lumped together.
The reason for this is that they .can exhibit similar error characteristics. But
there are important differences from a diagnosis viewpoint. An intermittent
• fault is considered to always be present, but its error pattern is only detectable
when it is in lits active mode. With this type of fault, if the error pattern is
detected at any time in a unit, then the unit is declared faulty. However, during
o
the times between which the intermittent fault is in an active mode, the unit
operates correctly; regardless, the unit is still classified as faulty and is
removed from the system. Indeed, an intermittent fault could be such that its
error pattern is almost never seen. Then even though a unit had such an internal
fault, it could still be utilized most of the time, and, perhaps, should not be
switched out. However, heretofore, there has been no means of analyzing such
possibilities. This is just another ramification of treating an intermittent fault
as though it were a permanent fault, because, clearly, for intermittent faults,
unlike permanent faults, the overall degradation of the system resulting from the
unit's removal might dominate the degradation resulting from intermittently faulty
operation of the unit if it remained in the system. The decision-making process
should consider this possibility for intermittent faults. The above can be more
strongly stated for transient faults since transient faults are considered to be
those induced from the external environment. The affected unit is not considered
to be faulty. It could make an error because of the fault and it could perform
flawlessly thereafter. Clearly, in this case the proper decision would not be to
disconnect it from the system. Or, a transient fault could be so prevalent that
the unit is almost always in error, and it should be switched out. Hence, it
should be clear that a diagnosis strategy for I/T faults must have greater dis-
crimination capability than that required for permanent faults.
It is our intention to use the Extended Outcome Matrix to evaluate diagnosis
strategies of fault tolerant computing systems in terms of the overall effect on
the system of a decision to remove/retain a unit when an error pattern caused by
an I/T fault has been detected. In such systems, there must always exist some
threshold for error levels which when exceeded results in the removal of a unit.
This threshold must be a compromise which takes into account all possible uses and
time criticalities of the system, and is probably at best near-optima! for any
situation. In effect, such diagnosis schemes either implicitly or explicitly
15
make use of a dynamic discriminator function. The current state of the system,
complexity of the program under execution, and penalty for an error _ust Net the
_iscriminant. When a unit exceeds an error level that has been set for it, it
is switched out. Ideally, the more idle the system and the fewer the switched out
units, the lower the discriminant should be. Alternatively, a damaged system,
running a time-critical program, must have a high discriminant. Since the system
cannot afford to lose any computing power, it can only switch out another unit
when its error level becomes intolerably high. Hence, an understanding of the
nature of the discrimination being employed by a system is crucial to analyzing
its diagnosing capabilities. With a complete description of the discrimination
and the Extended Outcome Matrix, we can then classify the performance of testing
strategies of various fault tolerant computing systems. Accordingly, we are
studying the concept of discrimination so that we can incorporate it into our
model. However, the applicability of this, and in fact, all of our work depends
entirely upon the availability of the Extended Outcome Matrix. Therefore, a
methodology for generating the extended outcome matrix and a case study of an
analysis using Intel 8080-based systems are fundamental parts of our program. We
discuss our efforts along these lines in the next section.
16
6, Verification of a Methodology to Generate the Extended Outcome Matrix
Dy generating the Extended Outcome Matrix, we mean that we must obtain
k,l
the a. . values for the units in the system. Because of the complexity of the1,3
units and task programs, it is currently not realistic to attempt to predict the
response of testing programs to units which can be inflicted by a multitude of
different faults while executing a wide variety of programs. Hence, a laboratory
system must be developed which can produce the probability values required for
different interacting units in this system. This system must provide for experi-
ments where one unit tests another unit while executing different programs in
each and while subjecting both units to realistic fault situations. We are evolv-
ing a methodology which would be the basis of such experiments.
There are two issues which must be understood regarding our work in this
part of the program:
First of all, if our methodology simply described a "brute-force" or
"eyhaustive" approach, we would really be accomplishing very little
of general significance. However, we are not doing this. Instead,
_;eare making some far-reaching conjectures about error pattern
generation and emulation (we will discuss these further in the next
section), and we are attempting to verify their validity with a
case study and describe a feasible means of generating the Extended
outcome Matrix which exploits them.
Secondly, the laboratory system we have developed (see photographs _
in Appendix) is a complex network of computing devices and instru-
mentation which we have totally designed,built, and debugged. The
instrumentation aspects of our system are intricate, finely timed
combinations of hardware and software which must perform critical
recording functions yet not interfere with the operation of the
fault-free and faulty 8080-based units. It would be difficult to
estimate the time we have spent on this system totally involved in
mundane yet necessary tasks of hardware/software design and debugging
but, easily, many hundreds of man-hours have been used in this work.
Admittedly, it is a bare-bones design and there are many ways which we
could enhance our system. Nevertheless, _;eknow of no other system quite
17
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like ours. Moreover, with it, we have already been able to conduct
preliminary experiments which _have allowed us to make some very interest-
ing (and reaffirming)observations regarding error patterns (_Jhich
will be discussed in the next section).
o.-
The key to our methodology is that we are employing a digital error
representation of faults on bus lines. However, as we cannot "prove" the
validity of our methodology, we must experimentally verify its validity. We are
doing this by considering a case study wherein a unit is an Intel 8080 micro-
computer module. A schematic of this module is shown in Figures 4 and 5. Such
a case study gives us a controlled framework for evolving the methodology in
that it provides highly important feedback to the evolution.
Our goal then is to generate an Extended Outcome Matrix where the Intel
8080-based system corresponds to both u and u . We intend to do so using a
I 3
digital error representation of I/T faults. The processor communications bus has
been selected as the system component upon which to develop the digital represen-
tation of the faults. To examine these bus lines, a gold processor is used for
comparison. The gold processor is identical to the faulty processor except that
the former is driven with a good power supply and the latter is driven %_ithan
I/T faulty power supply. We have only chosen to use I/T faults on the p_er
supply because we currently lack other substantiated databases of I/T faults.
Clearly I/T faults on the power supply line are realistic possibilities, and
therefore, our work is not negatively affected by their use in the experiments.
Moreover, as more fault data is produced (for example, from the current NASA funded
Univac I/T fault gathering project), we can readily (and will gladly) utilize it
in our study. As shown in Figure 6, a bus fault detector is used to determine
differences between the buses. The bus fault detector has an output for each bus
line, and indicates that the corresponding bus lines agree or disagree at any given
time. To view the action of the bus during and after a fault arrival, an error
catcher receives the bus difference signals and stores them for later retrieval by
a monitor processor. A storage oscilloscope permits close examination of the
error patterns. These digital error patterns are the "signatures" of the fault
classes and programs on the specific unit being considered. In other words, if
we change the structure of the unit (for example, suppose we were working with an
AMD 2900-based system), for the same classes of faults and programs, the signature
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21
in terms of the error patterns would be expected to change. However, the metho-
dology would remain the same; that is, we would still generate the signature for
the classes of faults and programs of interest.
These error patterns are our digital representation of I/T analog faults.
"" They are program dependent and unit dependent. For a specified unit, ui , testing
another specified unit, uj , if we can collect their error patterns, we can then
inject these error patterns in controlled situations into u. and u. to generatel 3
the Extended Outcome Matrix. Figure 7 shows such a set-up. The monitor processors
preload the fault stores with error information modeling fi and fk . _en the
proper address is detected, the fault stores dump the information into the fault
injection networks, duplicating the desired faults. U. tests u. , and informsl 3
its monitor processor of the test outcome. The set of such decisions is the
basis of the Extended Outcome Matrix.
With the Extended Outcome Matrices for all interacting units, we can then
apply the diagnosability theory we are now developing and measure the capability
of the fault tolerant computing system to identify combinations of I/T faulty units,
or suggest testing strategy modifications to enhance this capability.
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....i• 7. •Preliminary Observations on Error Patterns
Data is now being coilected from the experimental system schematically
shown in Figure 6. (See Appendix for photographs.) The I/T fault being pres-
ently injected is power supply noise and a number of different programs have
-" been used in the 8080-based gold and faulty units. We will describe in this
section some preliminary observations corresponding to error patterns for one
particular program, called INRI.0, which is a rather simple program being only
three lines and seven bytes long. A listing of INRI.0 is given in Figure ii.
The simplicity of INRI.0 is not important here, for observations similar to those
we will now describe have also been made for much more complex programs; we use
INRI.0 here only so that a relatively complete discussion of our observation can
be made without a great deal of descriptive overhead.
To begin, when faults are injected and error patterns observed, there is
the possibility regarding the outcome that, since we have no real control over
the injected I/T fault (it is simply noise on the power supply), every fault
pattern we observe for the same program will be different. If this werethe case,
then generating the entries in the Extended Outcome Matrix would be almost impos-
sible, since to do so would mean that we would have to emulate a very large set
of error patterns. However, this is not the case for simple combinational and
sequential circuits. For such circuits, there are fault/error equivalences _hich
allow all faulty modes of a circuit to be described with a reasonable n_mber of
fault equivalence classes. The question, then, is whether or not similar equiva-
lences hold for error patterns on much more complex systems? We conjecture that,
indeed, they do; and we offer the following observation relative to experiments
with our system for INRI.0.
Observation i: For INRI.0 , 250 runs were made to generate error
patterns. For these runs, 46 distinct error patterns were observed.
One specific error pattern accounted for 39% of that total. A
second pattern accounted for 19%. The fact that two patterns account
for over half (58%) of all the patterns generated indicates that
some type of error pattern equivalence notion is relevant and that
successful error data compression is feasible. The situation is
actually better than the above figures show. A number of different
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error patterns are of two families. Each family differs in only
_ a few places. The differences within a family are being explored,
and it is believed that to a large extent, each family will produce
the same results on the test system. This implies that then a few
°° families can potentially be used to account for almost all of the
error patterns generated.
A family of error patterns is shown in Figure 8. The possible types of
errors are address, data, and control errors. The values range from 0 to 3,
giving the number of error types in each window. Each pattern in this family
lasts for 47 cycles. It can be seen that pattern #59 covers all others in
the family, in the sense that no other pattern has more errors than pattern #59
at any given time, and each member of the family is basically pattern #59 with a
few missing errors. In general, each family can be covered by one of its members.
The fault/program interaction can be modeled _ith a set of families, and each
family of the set can be represented by one pattern. Hence, the overall inter-
action information can be reduced sufficiently to be usable while still retaining
sufficient information to permit distinguishability.
The next issue which must be addressed is, to generate the entries of the
Extended Outcome Matrix, we must emulate the error patterns. What is the com-
plexity of doing so? Again, for combinational and sequential circuits, it is
well-known, for example, that simple prime stuck-type faults exist and can be
injected to cause the circuits to display its faulty functional modes of opera-
tion. Can something similar be done for error patterns on much more complex
systems? We conjecture that, indeed, it can; and we offer the following obser-
vation relative to experiments with our system for INRI.0.
Observation 2: Detailed examination of the most common pattern
described in Observation 1 shows that a single error on the bus
generated the entire error pattern. Figure 9 shows the complete
bus pattern for type #59 (302). The first frame shows a single
error on D6. This one error is sufficient to generate the entire
pattern. The two processors are thrown out of synchronization,
and they converge 47 cycles later. From this it is evident that
the error patterns consist of two portions. The beginning part
is the prime excitation period (PEP), a_d the pattern subsequent
to that is a result of that excitation. During the PEP, the
fault is either directly acting on the bus lines or for the very
first time the results of the fault are propagated to the bus.
After the PEP, the faulty processor is performing correctly, but
is not in agreement with the gold unit because the faulty unit
has diverged to a different path of execution. In the specific
case of Figure 9, the paths do converge later, but this will not
always happen with larger programs. (This has been experimentally
verified with a program called FMP2.0). Therefore description of
the PEP and the arrival location is sufficient to describe the
: entire error pattern. In the case of pattern #59, the PEP is
just one instruction in length, and this pattern is the most
prevalent (39%) of all the patterns.
The above leads to a final conjecture which we are now examining: for
specified faults and programs, a high percentage of all the error patterns pro-
duced can be modeled by a small number of single instruction errors. If
proven true, this would indeed be a remarkable result. Our sought after com-
pression would then come naturally from error pattern families which could be
reproduced by single byte errors. This would have to be related in some way to
program sensitivities as implemented on the target processor. However, our
preliminary investigation at this point gives no clues as to how it could be
predicted that, for example, 39% of all patterns could absolutely be duplicated
by a single bus error at a single address.
We can then summarize our I/T fault modeling hierarchy as shown in Figure i0.
The true model of the I/T fault is an analog model. The most basic digital repre-
sentation of this I/T analog model is a complete detailing of fault-free, stuck-at-
one, or stuck-at-zero conditions on every line in the system. (Such a model would
be used with a gate level simulator.) A more tractable, compressed form of this
digital representation would be the error pattern on the bus lines. This, however,
leads to an even more compressed model represented by a PEP, which seems to
correspond to a single (or, perhaps, a few) instruction failures. The implication
of this hiearchy is that the fault store for emulation of error patterns can be
quite simple.
iLl'......f-' ...../-!-n/-I rr] rr rl L .. ....
'°'_r-,_f...... ....J--i..... .....r-r!...... SL JL_ _
Figure 8: A family of error pattern_ for program I_I.0
n_ llelloeo.eoloellloeeeleeleeeeeeeloeeooeelleeloelooe
D6 Xeoeoeoeeoeoeooeoooooeoeeoooeoeeoooeooooeoooooeoe
D5 . . .XX..XX..XX.. XX. ,XX.. XX.. XX..XX.. XX..XX.. XX ....
. . . XX..XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX..XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX....
D3 . . . XX..XX.. XX.. XX..XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX ....
D2 . . . XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX.. XX. , XX.. XX.. XX.. XX ....
nl eoooeoeeoeooeeeoeeooooeoooeooooeoooeoooooeeoooooe
DO eoooeoooeooooooooooooeeeeeoeee6ooooeooeeooeeoeeeo
AI5-A6 .................. . ..............................
A5 ........................... XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX . .
A4 ............ XXXXXXXXXXXXX ............. XXXXXXXXX . .
A3 ...... XX X XXX ....... X XXXXX ....... XXX XXX ...... XXX • .
A2 . . .XXX... XXX .... XXX...XXX...XXXX... XXX... XXX .....
A1 .... X.X. XXXX. X.X .... X.X.XXXX.X.X .... X.X.XXXX. X...
AO .... XXXX .... XXXX .... XXXX .... XXXX .... XX XX .... XXX . .
Address . . . X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X . .
Data X . . X X . . X X . . X X . . X X . o X X . . X X . . X X . . X X . . X X . . X X . . X X ....
Control .... X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X . . . X ....
Z._E_ .... X . . . X . . . X . . . X . o , X . o , X o . . X .... X . o . X . . . X . . o X ....
Error X . . X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X . ,
Gold
Address 1230123012301230123012301230123012301230123012301
Faulty 1 3 6 8 B D i0 12 15 17 IA IC IF 21 24 26 29 2B 2E 30 33 35 38 3A
Address 2 4 7 9 C E II 13 16 18 IB ID 20 22 25 27 2A 2C 2F 31 3& 36 39 0
Composition of patterns #302, 286, 292, 297, 302, 310
X = bus difference
Figure 9: Complete bus error pattern for type #59 (302) for program INR!°0
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0001 0000 ;SIMPLE PROGRAM FOR USE WITH
0002 0000
0003 0000 ;ERROR PATTERN EXPERIS_NTS
00O4 0000
O0O5 0000
0006 0000 ;INRI.0
OOO7 0000
0008 0000 ;JULY, 1979
0009 0000
0010 0000
0011 0000 ;ROBERT GLASER
0012 0000
0013 0000
0014 0000
0015 0000 ORG 0
0016 0000 3C START: INR A
0017 0001 C3 00 00 JMP START
0018 0004
0049 0004
0020 0004
0021 0004 ; INTERRUPT LOCATION
0022 0004
0023 0004 ORG 38H
0024 0038 C3 00 00 JMP START
0025 003B
002G 003B
0027 003B
0028 003B ;ALL UNSPECIFIED ADDRESSES ARE 00
Figure II: INRI.0 program
3O
8. Conclusion
We believe that the multi-faceted program being conducted in the
Electrical Engineering Department at Johns Hopkins is in agreement with NASA's
goals in the fault tolerant computing area. The parallel, tightly coupled
theoretical and experimental efforts in which we are engaged can truly make a
contribution to the validation process of fault tolerant computing systems.
The eventual diagnosability analysis of systems of the complexity of SIFT and
FTMP is achievable, and on the basis of such analysis the reconfiguration capa-
bilities of these systems can be emulated. Such evaluations will make funda-
mental contribution to the validation process of fault tolerant computing systems.
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